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OBJECTS IN MIRROR ARE CLOSER THAN
THEY APPEAR*
Aviam Soifer**
I. REMEMBRANCE
The words of the Ba'al Shem Toy inscribed at Yad Vashem, the
Holocaust Memorial in Jerusalem, remind us that "The key to
redemption is remembrance."1 Remembrance itself is a mitzvah,
a sacred obligation anchored in repeated scriptural injunctions.
Children who become bar and bat mitzvot at age thirteen may
learn that the verb zakhor (remember) occurs 13 x 13 or 169 times
in the Bible and they are taught that this numerology is signifi-
cant. The word appears "usually with either Israel or God as the
subject, for memory is incumbent upon both."2 Yet there are
crucial differences-as well as significant overlaps-between
memory of the past, meaning in history, and the kind of historical
inquiry that is largely concerned with accurate chronology and
concrete facts. Too often, the term "history" is used to blur or
ignore these differences. Indeed, incorrect history and inadequate
memory are in and of themselves devastatingly destructive for
* 0 Aviam Soifer. This title is the warning on the right, sideview mirror of automobiles
sold recently in the United States. Steve Wizner pointed out some of the greater
implications of this curious phrase to me. The phrase conveys an idea that is strange both
as a matter of technology and of ontology. (Is it not possible, and safer, to make objects
appear as they are or further than they are-if the phrase is correct in suggesting that
objects are what we believe they are?) Cf. "Movement in the Distance Is Larger Up Close,*
a poem in LAWRENCE JOSEPH, BEFORE OUR EYES 66 (1993) (invoking Walter Benjamin's
History's Optic).
I briefly explored the relationship of law, history, and mirrors in Aviam Soifer, Beyond
Mirrors: Lawrence Friedman's Moving Pictures, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 995 (1988). Now I
argue that lack of awareness of what exists behind us is particularly troubling in the context
of judicial opinions that deal with Native American legal claims. A short version of this
argument will appear as 'The Task of Hearing What Has Already Been Said": History and
Native American Legal Claims, 23 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RT. 1(1994).
** Dean & Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.
1 It seems fitting to begin with this quotation, which concluded my discussion of the role
of 'involuntary groups" in Aviam Soifer, On Being Overly Discrete and Insular: Involuntary
Groups and the Anglo-American Judicial Tradition, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 381 (1991).
This essay continues that exploration.3 YOSEF HAYIM YERUSHALMI, ZAKHOR: JEWISH HISTORY AND JEWISH MEMORY 5 (1989).
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those who have endured the gravest wrongs in the past.
To illuminate this point, this Essay considers several recent
invocations of history by American judges. It does so in the context
of Native American legal claims,3 but its point about the demands
and abuse of history has broader implications. My argument is
that each of three distinct judicial approaches to the past exempli-
fied by these decisions is seriously flawed. Taken together,
however, these cases underscore how claims purportedly derived
from history can become a powerful whipsaw. As we will see, these
decisions employ history inconsistently, yet with devastating
effectiveness. They demonstrate how commonplace it is for judges
to make claims from history, while blithely remaining blind to the
crucial understandings at the confluence of memory, meaning, and
historical accuracy.
Judicial lapses in remembrance are hardly trivial. Indeed, such
flaws extend far beyond specific results-the bottom lines-in the
three decisions at issue. None of these cases is in itself obviously
of great import. Even the two United States Supreme Court
decisions appear almost insignificant in their specific outcomes.
But the horrors of this century show that even if "[r]esponsibility
for a burdened past can justifiably become less preoccupying as
other experiences are added to the national legacy," it remains
inestimably important to understand that "like the half-life of
radioactive material, there is no point at which responsibility
simply goes away.'
II. NATIE AMERICAN LEGAL CLAIMS
Decisions that undermine Native American legal claims are
hardly unusual in our nation's history. Yet three very recent
decisions, Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak,5 State v. Elliott,6
'I generally use the term "Native American," but I also employ "Indian" when that seems
to make historical or stylistic sense. The claims I discuss involve quite different legal
matters. They concern, respectively, government benefits, land claims, and sovereignty over
hunting and fishing rights.
' CHARLES S. MAIER, THE UNMASTERABLE PAST. HISTORY, HOLOCAUST, AND GERMAN
NATIONAL IDENTrIY 15 (1988).
5 111 S. Ct. 2578 (1991).
6 616 A.2d 210 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1258 (1993).
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and South Dakota v. Bourland,7 vividly indicate routine ways in
which judges emulate soldiers and settlers in a rush to establish a
new "reality on the ground," a legal fait accompli that somehow is
said to legitimize unburdening the American landscape of its most
longstanding population.
It is a remarkable irony that, at the core of all three judicial
opinions discussed in this Essay, we will find the assertion that it
is history itself that compels the extirpation of memory, meaning,
and precision about the country's past burdens. Even in our
modern (or postmoder) world, measured judicial words still are
able to do immeasurable violence to what was and what could be.
That bitter irony is equalled-if not exceeded-when we begin to
analyze some techniques that contemporary judges employ to
devalue and ultimately to dismiss the weight of words. Justice
Antonin Scalia, now joined by his acolyte, Justice Clarence Thomas,
likes to insist that there must be strict judicial fidelity to legal
texts. Yet when we turn to majority opinions written by Scalia and
Thomas respectively, we will see that these judges simply wave
away directly relevant texts and language, claiming that they must
do so in the service of history.
As part of the Court's unseemly gallop in the direction of more
limited governmental responsibility towards Native Americans-or
towards anyone else, for that matter-a majority of the Justices
resort to some great spirit of abstract concepts and to dubious
claims of implicit past understandings. We will see that the
Vermont Supreme Court similarly invokes history. The Vermont
version is an even more abstract concept of implicit, cumulative,
and undifferentiated past encumbering. In a peculiar kind of
symbiosis, these judges assign responsibility to history for the
outcomes they obviously must struggle to reach. They purportedly
use history to trump texts that point in the opposite direction.
Although all three decisions invoke "history," it will become obvious
that in all three memory is made irrelevant, meaning is stretched
past the breaking point, and accuracy about the past is rendered
entirely irrelevant.
The first decision pays homage to Abstract History, the next to
Cumulative History, and the last to Implicit History. Noatak
7 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993).
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purports to rely on the logic of history,' Elliott on the gathering
weight of history,9 and Bourland on what history the Court claims
it can infer.10 All are entirely unsatisfactory.
In their quest for the compulsion of history, moreover, the judges
play fast and loose with legal language and with meaning itself.
There seems to be a widespread desire to find a fixed, unitary, and
"correct" rule for interpreting language. History must carry all that
baggage in these decisions. Unfortunately, these three decisions
exemplify the way contemporary American judges tend to seek a
unified, generalized vision-and dub it History.
This propensity is particularly ironic in the context of legal
claims by Native Americans. It also contrasts sharply with Native
American perspectives. Among Native Americans, as Brian Swann
put it, "[r]eality is not 'controlled,' no matter on how high a plane.
We would do better to talk of reciprocity, balancing, right acting
and right telling in the interests of equilibrium."1 It is dangerous
to generalize sweepingly. At a minimum, however, qualities such
as reciprocity, balancing, right acting, and right telling might be
said to encapsulate vital elements of good, or even great, judgment.
It is noteworthy, therefore, when we find such qualities obviously
absent in contemporary judicial responses to the legal claims of
Native Americans.
A. NATIVE VILLAGE OF NOATAX: HISTORY AS ABSTRACTION
Judicial myopia about history in the context of Native American
rights is itself a tragic old story.12 The recent case of Blatchford
" See infra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
"
1 SMOOTHING THE GROUND: ESSAYS ON NATIVE AMERICAN ORAL LITERATURE xi (Brian
Swann ed., 1983). Swam quotes Lame Deer's explanation: "We Indians live in a world of
symbols and images where the spiritual and the commonplace are one." Id. at xii (quoting
JOHN FIRE ET AL., LAME DEER, SEEKER OF VISIONS 101 (1972)).
2 See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990); Milner Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian
Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 3; Rennard Strickland, Dances with Lawyers: Wolves,
Judges, and Other Medicine Men, 69 TE. L. REV. 995 (1991) (reviewing WILLIAMS, supra).
For a snappy yet careful overview, see PETRA SHATrUCK & JILL NORGREN, PARTIAL JUSTICE:
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW IN A LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM (1991).
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v. Native Village of Noatak13 proves, however, that a story need
not be old to be tragic, comic, or both. In this seemingly dry,
technical decision about the sovereign immunity of state govern-
ments, Native American tribal identity became entangled in the
loose ends of one of the most abstract and convoluted categories in
American constitutional law. In holding that a native village could
not sue Alaska, Justice Scalia's majority opinion began by conced-
ing that "Indian tribes are sovereigns."'4 Scalia had to admit that
the Court was not relying on the text of the Eleventh Amendment,
but rather on "the presupposition of our constitutional structure
which [the Eleventh Amendment] confirms." 5 (This reliance on
untethered structural presuppositions is striking in itself, but even
more so because it emerged from the word processor of a Justice
who insistently claims to be a strict textualist.) Yet our concern is
not with a mystical form of Eleventh Amendment doctrine. What
is significant about Native Village of Noatak is how the Court
hacked through a basic historical riddle: the Gordian Knot of the
legal status of Native American tribes.
From the decisions of Chief Justice John Marshall through the
Court's most recent precedents, the sovereignty of tribes in North
America has been anomalous, inconsistent, and remarkably
malleable. Pronouncements on the subject by all the branches of
the federal government, and by both federal and state courts, have
fluctuated with changing demands made by the majority culture. 6
' 111 S. Ct. 2578 (1991). Justice Scalia wrote for the majority and Justice Blackmun
dissented, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens.
Id. at 2581.
15Id. The Eleventh Amendment states: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law and equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. For the remarkably convoluted history of the
amendment, see JOHN ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT IN AMERIcAN HISTORY (1987). That Scalia and his fellow textualists practice
a peculiar and an inconsistent brand of originalism is obvious to any reader of the Court's
opinions, but the point is captured succinctly in George Kannar, The Constitutional
Catechism ofAntonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297 (1990); and Glenn H. Reynolds, Penumbral
Reasoning on the Right, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1333 (1992).
' Milner Ball provides a wonderfully clear and convincing demonstration of inconsisten-
cies and obtuseness within the "shabby tales composed by the Supreme Court," Ball, supra
note 12, at 139, as the Justices repeatedly have manipulated legal doctrine to reassert the
apparent paradox that "the Court's law is that might is the basis of federal power over
Indian nations," id. at 137.
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Today, however, it is allegedly again clear that surviving Native
American tribes did retain their sovereignty; tribal self-determina-
tion is again repeatedly said to be an overriding value. 7
The puzzle presented in Noatak, therefore, was whether renewed
legal sensitivity about tribal sovereignty involves recognition of
sovereignty akin to that of foreign states or sovereignty that is
analogous to that of the fifty states within the federal union. 8
This categorization was crucial: Eleventh Amendment doctrine has
it, on the one hand, that the amendment shields states within the
United States from suit by foreign sovereigns. On the other hand,
any state may sue another state without confronting an Eleventh
Amendment barrier. 9 The suit came to the Court from as far
away as possible-the Native Village of Noatak is located on the
Bering Strait-and the Justices got nowhere near either the
practical realities of the case or any relevant history.
The suit arose when Alaska reneged on a 1980 statute that
granted every Native Village $25,000.20 On the advice of Alaska's
Attorney General, however, the legislature later expanded the
recipient class, thereby diluting each Native Village share so that
Noatak never received its full initial allotment.2' The case
" See generally Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope and
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195 (1984). For example, the Court celebrated self-
determination in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505,510 (1991) ("These Acts reflect Congress' desire to promote the'goal
of Indian self-government, including its "overriding goal" of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency
and economic development.' *) (quoting California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480
U.S. 202, 216 (1987)).
18 Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (1991).
'Compare Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (holding Court has no jurisdiction
over suit brought against state by foreign state) with South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192
U.S. 286 (1904) (holding Court has jurisdiction over action brought by one state against
another). For the current doctrine and background of the legal tangle surrounding the
"anachronistic fiction* of sovereign immunity, see Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 498 U.S. at 514
(Stevens, J., concurring); ORTH, supra note 15; Vicki C. Jackson, Jackson, The Supreme
Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988).
o Noatak, 111 S. Ct. at 2580.
I1 d. Noatak was joined by two other tribal entities in its suit. The State Attorney
General had advised that the 1980 statute, in specifying Native Villages for beneficial
treatment, violated equal protection. Id. Though Alaska has run into equal protection
difficulties in attempts to distribute some of the bounty from the oil pipeline to citizens, on
the basis of their relative longevity within the state, Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982),
the Attorney General's opinion here seems at least dubious. It would not have been difficult,
for example, to prove through the totality of circumstances the kind of past discrimination
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presented an array of complicated jurisdictional issues,22 but the
majority ignored those in order to answer with a simple, sweeping,
surprising assertion: Native American tribes are like foreign
nations.' Such tribes are Native and American; they are under
the plenary power and alleged protection of the federal government;
and their members are all citizens of the United States; but the
Court chose to see a tribe as a tribe that is more like Monaco than
Montana.
What appealed to Scalia and his colleagues, of course, was that
the Court's stark choice immunized states against tribal claims.
The Court's holding about tribal identity was anything but the
product of enlightened revisionist history. Rather, Scalia offered
only a pseudo-formalist choice, purportedly premised on the original
intent of the constitutional framers: "Just as in Monaco with
regard to foreign sovereigns, so also here with regard to Indian
tribes, there is no compelling evidence that the Founders thought
such a surrender [of immunity] inherent in the constitutional
compact."24 But this is remarkably abstract metaphysics. There
is no "compelling evidence" about an issue no one could have
imagined at the time.
As Judge John T. Noonan, Jr. held for the lower court in the
case, Indian tribes clearly were treated as separate sovereigns long
before 1789.' They could be found in every original state and
relations with them were sensitive and dangerous. Moreover, when
a major political crisis arose over Georgia's defiance of the Court in
needed to defend the statutory plan if any plaintiff actually had been able to overcome
jurisdictional difficulties and wished to launch an equal protection attack.
At the most basic level, the treatment of Alaska's native peoples-who welcomed white
settlers--as directly analogous to "conquered" tribes in the "lower 48" states flies in the face
of history, despite the lumping together of all Native Americans for purposes of federal
government control upheld in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
Moreover, recently the Court repeatedly has upheld differential treatment of Native
Americans quite readily, arguing that such classifications are political, not racial, and
therefore need only be rationally related to some acceptable governmental purpose. See, e.g.,
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (holding no racial discrimination in Indian
preference in employment); Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979)
(holding no equal protection violation in inconsistent state jurisdiction over Indian territory).
Noatak, 111 S. Ct. at 2580.
'
3 Id. at 2581-82.
"Id. at 2582.
2Native Village of Noatak v. Hoffman, 896 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1990).
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the context of the Cherokee Removal policy during Andrew
Jackson's presidency, Chief Justice John Marshall explicitly
rejected the idea that tribes were foreign states.26 Marshall held
that an Indian tribe might be a nation, but that such a tribe "is not
a foreign state, in the sense of the constitution."27  Marshall
directly denied the claims of state sovereignty Georgia had pursued
so vigorously as to threaten the survival of the new nation.'
Noatak, by contrast, is so committed to state sovereignty that the
decision simply turns somersaults with the Marshall opinions that
have been the bedrock of American Indian law for over 150 years.
Scalia set out to create his alternate legal universe as if these
elemental precedents did not exist. The Marshall Court made clear
that the Constitution could not "comprehend" Indian tribes within
the "general term 'foreign nations.' " 29 John Marshall, moreover,
surely was not committed to finding some legal mask for relegating
Indian claims to the unsympathetic mercies of state court systems.
It is therefore a fundamental irony that the Noatak Court
blithely plunged into the flood of legal developments over several
centuries with eyes closed tight against the fact that, in those
precedents, Indian tribes have been deeply, tragically sui generis.
The Justices attempted to float free, using only a flimsy syllogism.
Scalia simply assumed that the relevant inquiry involves only the
relative role of the states, foreign nations, and tribes at the time of
the constitutional convention. It is plausible to imagine, according
to Scalia, that the states surrendered sovereign immunity on a
theory of mutuality in 1789.0 Yet Scalia claimed that "[t]here is
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 20 (1831).
Id. at 17-18. In this decision, and again in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832), Marshall emphasized the relationship between the federal government and the
Indian tribes. Marshall's approach as well as his language cannot be reconciled with that
of the Noatak Court's embrace of Alaska's state sovereign immunity claims. Instead,
Marshall constructed the "dependent domestic nations" categorization of tribal relationships
to the federal government that has dominated, and haunted, Indian law ever since. Cherokee
Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. For a careful study of the background of the Georgia cases,
see Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN.
L. REV. 500 (1969).
" Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20-21.
2 Id. at 19. Therefore, the Court held, Indian tribes could not invoke the United States
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction under Article III, which foreign nations clearly could
invoke. Id. at 20.
'o Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578, 2582 (1991).
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no such mutuality with either foreign sovereigns or Indian
tribes." 1 Ergo, Indian tribes are like foreign nations.
At first glance, the holding that there is tribal sovereignty
analogous to that of foreign nations might seem a great victory for
tribal identity. If it were taken seriously and followed in other
contexts, it would have important unanticipated implications, for
example, in the realms of international law and human rights
guarantees. The analogy to foreign nations serves to underscore a
whole series of basic contradictions in the legal status of Native
Americans. Within the logic of Noatak, for example, tribal Indians
have had a unique form of dual citizenship thrust upon them. As
we will see, however, the Court's approach in Noatak actually is
but one in a set of extremely statist decisions that have emerged
recently when the Court deals with rights claimed by Native
Americans, either as individuals or as members of groups.32 The
Court's belated rediscovery of tribal sovereignty, deemed to be akin
to foreign sovereignty in Noatak, seems merely a stepping stone
toward further shrinkage of the legal protections of Native
Americans. This is sovereignty without authority. It is abstract
history without respect for precedent. Under Noatak, Native
Americans are doubly alienated.'
Even when the Justices do recognize tribal authority, they re-
" Id. at 2582-83. The specific state sovereign immunity issue had been discussed earlier
only in scattered dicta, largely because the prevalent theory was that the federal government
had plenary power over the tribes, including the right and the duty to sue states on their
behalf, thus overcoming any Eleventh Amendment barrier. A 1966 statutory change
explicitly altered federal court jurisdiction to give tribes the ability to sue by themselves, but
the Court in Noatak held that Congress had not been adequately explicit to lift the states'
Eleventh Amendment barrier. Id. at 2584-86.
" When Native American religious claims were at stake, for example, Scalia again wrote
for the Court and purported to recognize the "relative disadvantage" of minority religious
practices. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
Yet he relegated such religious claims exclusively to protection through the political process,
proclaiming this to be the 'unavoidable consequence of democratic government." Id.
" See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (holding foreign citizens
not entitled to protection from kidnapping by federal government); VINE DELORIA, JR. &
CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN
SOVEREIGNTY (1984) (reviewing history of Indian self-government); Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws
Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections on the Content and Character of American
Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 202 (1989) (discussing "fictional" history of Indian law).
5411994]
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:533
emphasize Congress's plenary power over tribes.' To be sure, it
is not easy to classify tribal groups or to categorize the range of
their authority. As a legal entity, the tribe has not been respected
as "a distinct political society, separated from others, capable of
managing its own affairs and governing itself" 5 since the days of
John Marshall. Even Marshall's idea of a "domestic dependent na-
tion"7 marked an unwieldy, ambiguous compromise. But if ever
freedom of association should have constitutional clout, it ought to
be in cases brought by remaining Native American tribes that
assert tribal rights." Yet in Noatak, the Court raced high enough
up the ladder of legal abstraction to ignore centuries of history.
From that height, it was relatively easy to proclaim Native
American tribes to be akin to foreign nations without thinking
about possible implications.8 Centuries of development, and the
34See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S.
505 (1991) (holding, in a unanimous decision, that a state may not tax tribal members but,
despite longstanding practice, may prospectively tax sales by tribal members to non-
members); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 684 (1990) (holding "inherent sovereignty of the
Indian tribes does not extend to criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes
on the reservation"); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (rejecting individual
sex discrimination claim against tribe on jurisdictional ground, holding that Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968 protects tribal sovereignty but emphasizing Congress's plenary power to
override tribal authority if it sees fit). Ironically, in Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 718
(1987), the Court unanimously held that Congress's plenary power did not extend to a good
faith effort to deal with a serious, intractable problem: the "extreme fractionation of Indian
lands.' Although the Court conceded that the congressional plan would benefit all members
of the tribes, and that the fractionation problem was a product of the "disastrous" federal
allotment policy and would be compounded over time, the Justices determined that the right
of individual property holders to pass on even de minimus property holdings was so vital as
to invalidate the statute on constitutional grounds.
' Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
3 Id. at 17.
" I make an extended argument for redefining and recognizing the importance of such
a right in a book I am finishing, which has the working title, KEEPING COMPANY: THE
SUBSTANCE OF PLURALISM IN AMERICAN LAw AND HUMANITIES (forthcoming).
Part of the problem, of course, is that there may not be any implications in a Court
that seems little concerned about consistency even within contemporary decisions. In County
of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226,249 (1985), for example, the Court simply
proclaimed that tribes are not akin to foreign nations for purposes of invoking the political
question doctrine. See generally David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection
Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 759 (1991) (arguing that law separating
Indians and non-Indians involves a suspect classification, but that tribal sovereignty means
that equal protection has "a special and different meaning in Indian country); a response
by Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Not Strictly Racial: A Response to "Indians as Peoples," 39
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 169 (1991); and Williams's reply, David C. Williams, Sometimes Suspect:
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Court's own building-block decisions about tribal status, simply
landed in the Justices' conceptualist dustbin.
B. STATE V. ELLIO2T: HISTORY AS CUMULATIVE
Just as formalistic manipulation of categories can be used to
defeat tribal legal claims, so can purportedly hard-boiled, contempo-
rary policy judgments. The Vermont Supreme Court, for example,
recently denied the aboriginal rights of Abenaki Indians to fish in
the streams of their ancestral homelands without state licenses.39
The case arose when Native Americans staged a "fish-in" demon-
stration. The defendants were members of a group of thirty-six
people whose defense against charges of fishing without a license
invoked "aboriginal rights," premised on their membership in a
viable tribe that had existed from "time immemorial" and that had
never ceded its land.4°
The Vermont Supreme Court succinctly and unanimously rejected
the Native American claims. The core of Justice Morse's opinion
for the court was that the Indian claims had been voided by "the
increasing weight of history."4' As the court reversed a trial court
decision that had dismissed the criminal charges against the
Abenaki, the justices maintained that it simply did not matter that
the Abenaki had never ceded their claims by treaty. The court held
that the extinguishment of Native American claims occurred, not
through any discrete events, but rather via "the cumulative effect
of many historical events."42
The cumulative events the court relied upon involved the period
preceding Vermont's statehood, which the court conceded was such
"a confusing era "43 that the court refused to decide whether the
government of Vermont did or did not enjoy legal sovereignty over
the land in question." Nonetheless, the alchemy of teleological
A Response to Professor Goldberg-Ambrose, 39 U.C.LA L. REV. 191 (1991).
State v. Elliott, 616 A.2d 210 (Vt. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1258 (1993).
Id. at 211. Under Vermont law, there is an exception to fishing license requirements
for persons who fish on their own property. Id. at 211 n.1.41 1d. at 218.
42Id.
4Id. at 221.
4Id. at 220.
1994] 543
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
faith transformed old wrongs. Progress, or at least a long line of
dubious white land grabs and unsubstantiated legal maneuverings,
obliterated clear, longstanding aboriginal rights.45  The court
simply inferred that the early white settlers of Vermont-in the
admitted absence of any explicit legal extinguishment of aboriginal
title-eliminated Native American claims through the simple
expedient of cumulatively wishing to do so. Moreover, specific
attention to history might undercut the basic ideal of treating
everyone the same. As the local state attorney said in celebration
of the decision: "We think this affirms our position all along...
that all Vermonters are equal before the law.'
C. SOUTH DAKOTA V. BOURLAND: HISTORY AS IMPLICIT
The United States government and the Sioux Nation signed the
Fort Laramie Treaty in 1868. This was their second effort to end
the Powder River War, which began when the United States Army
came to the aid of settlers who claimed sovereignty over the Great
Plains. Under the 1868 treaty, the Sioux agreed to remain within
the "Great Sioux Reservation," some twenty-six million acres "set
apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" by the
' The Vermont Supreme Court described the lower court's "exhaustive effort" that
produced "extensive and meticulous findings' and determined that the Abenaki had settled
in northwest Vermont by 9300 B.C. and had occupied that area as "an intact tribe* from that
date to the present. Id. at 214. But the supreme court decided that voluminous genealogi-
cal, ethnological, and archeological evidence of an unbroken tribal presence faded away
before the dubious claims of squatters and adventurers. Joseph W. Singer does a fine job of
documenting how bizarre the court's interpretation of early Vermont history really is in
Joseph William Singer, Well Settled?: The Increasing Weight of History in American Indian
Land Claims, 28 GA. L. REV. 481 (1994); see also MICHAEL A. BELLESILES, REVOLUTIONARY
OUTLAWS: ETHAN ALLEN AND THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE ON THE EARLY AMERICAN
FRONTIER (1993).
For anthropological and legal critiques of another attempt to wrestle with a similar,
longstanding clash of cultures in a contemporary courtroom, see Identity in Mashpee, in
JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: TWENTIETH-CENTURY ETHNOGRAPHY,
LITERATURE, AND ART 277 (1988); Gerald Torres and Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnondio
by Precedent and Evidence: the Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625.
" Vermont Court Says History Voids Land Claims ofAbenaki Indians, N.Y. TIMES, June
18, 1992, at D23.
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Sioux.47  The United States also agreed that non-Indians would
not "ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in" the
Great Sioux Reservation." By 1889, however, Congress had
decided to remove a great deal of land from the existing reservation
and to subdivide the remaining territory into several reserva-
tions.49 Moreover, by then Congress already had superimposed
the allotment policy of the Dawes Act of 1887, which sought
explicitly to break up the tribal structure, transform Indian land
into individual fee simple parcels, establish the federal government
as trustee for the bulk of the land, and gradually permit resale of
land to non-Indians.
Over a century ago, nonetheless, even the Supreme Court
recognized that it was tragically clear that the "very weakness and
helplessness" of the Indians actually came about "due to the course
of dealing of the Federal Government with them."5' The Court
also emphasized that the federal government owed the Indians a
'" Treaty with the Sioux Indians, Apr. 29, 1868, U.S.-Sioux Tribes, 15 Stat. 635, 636.
Despite a requirement in that treaty that there be no further cession of lands without formal
written approval "by at least three-fourths of all the adult male Indians," id. at art. XII,
within a decade Congress explicitly broke the 1868 treaty. In 1877, Congress formally
adopted a purported agreement signed by 10% of the Sioux men. The 10% who "agreed" also
gave up hunting rights in some unceded land in exchange for the rations desperately needed
for survival. In the wake of the ferociously severe winter of 1875-76, the Battle of Little Big
Horn and the later slaughter of the Sioux at Wounded Knee, some of the Indians-denied
even subsistence rations by official congressional policy and deprived of all their horses and
weapons--gradually relinquished their claims to the Black Hills and other land. The bare
bones of this legal and social history is set out in United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians,
448 U.S. 371, 377-81 (1980).
"Treaty with the Sioux Indians, Apr. 29, 1868, U.S.-Sioux Tribes, 15 Stat. 635, 636.
49 Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888. Of those rights guaranteed the Sioux under
the 1868 Fort Laramie treaty, this 1889 Act now guaranteed only those "not in conflict" with
the new statute. Id. § 19, 25 Stat. at 896.
'* The General Allotment (Dawes Severalty) Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, was a
reform measure premised on the assumption that, because of their tribal units, the Indians
lacked what Dawes described as the 'selfishness which is at the bottom of civilization,"
quoted in ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN 21-22 (1940) (recounting liquidation of
civilized Indian tribes). Its story is told well in D.S. OTIS, THE DAWES ACT AND THE
ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS (Francis P. Prucha ed., 1973).
5' United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (upholding the Major Crimes Act
of 1885, removing jurisdiction over seven criminal offenses from the tribes).
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duty of "care and protection." 2 It followed, said the Court, that
"technical rules" ought not to be used against Indian claims; rather,
equitable principles and "that larger reason which constitutes the
spirit of the law of nations" provided a legal basis to favor the
substance of Indian claims despite technical barriers."
James Bradley Thayer, a renowned Brahmin and Harvard Law
School professor, in 1891 described for the educated general
readership of the Atlantic Monthly a flood of abuses and miscon-
ceived efforts to aid Indians, whom he considered "A People
Without Law."5 Thayer argued that now the federal government
owed an affirmative duty. "The mere neglect or refusal to act is
itself action," Thayer explained, "and action of the worst kind.""
Thayer invoked history to demolish the very notion that neutrality
or neglect could constitute fairness in the context of governmental
dealings with Indian tribes. He wrote against the vivid backdrop
of devastation wrought through past encounters by government
officials with the Indians.
Litigation by some members of the Sioux Nation to gain compen-
sation for the undisputed abrogation of the Fort Laramie Treaty by
Congress and the seizure of their lands in the Black Hills has
dragged on since 1920. The latest-but surely not the last-round
of litigation culminated in United States v. Sioux Nation of
Indians.' In Sioux Nation, Justice Blackmun's majority opinion
held that Congress could constitutionally waive the res judicata
effect of a prior Court of Claims decision and thereby allow the
Sioux to sue.57 For our purposes, what is striking is Relnquist's
" Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 28 (1886). For further details about the
legal entanglements of the Choctaw, who had been slaveholders and who aligned themselves
with the losing side in the Civil War, see Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and
Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 LAW & HIST.
REV. 249, 266-68 (1987).
Choctaw Nation, 119 U.S. at 28.
"James Bradley Thayer, A People Without Law (pts. 1 & 2), 68 ATLAIrC MONTHLY 540,
676 (1891).
Id. at 678.
448 U.S. 371 (1980). The interesting technical and constitutional aspects of Justice
Blackmun's majority opinion, allowing the new judicial review on the merits, and then-
Justice Rehnquist's vigorous dissent, need not concern us here. In addition to the majority
and dissenting opinions, Justice White filed a single-paragraph opinion concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment. Id. at 424 (White, J., concurring).
57 Id. at 407.
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strong objection to Justice Blackmun's reliance on "'revisionist'
historians" and on "a view of the settlement of the American West
which is not universally shared." 8
To Rehnquist, it was somehow shocking that the majority used
history"not universally shared." Rehnquist seemed upset primarily
because he believed that the Court and Congress had been overly
sensitive in response to the long history of depredations against the
Sioux.59 Rehnquist insisted that while the Government "undoubt-
edly" employed "greed, cupidity, and other less-than-admirable
tactics ... during the Black Hills episode," it also was significant
that "the Indians did not lack their share of villainy either."'
Rehnquist set out to correct the "stereotyped and one-sided
impression" created by the majority by pointing out that different
historians take different positions.6 Rehnquist then asserted,
"This is not unnatural, since history, no more than law, is not an
exact (or for that matter an inexact) science."62 Even this summa-
ry-a remarkably tangled sentence that employs a quadruple nega-
tive-was not sufficient to put history in its proper place.
Instead, Rehnquist felt obliged to conclude his angry dissent with
another curious historiographic reflection: "But in a court opinion,
as a historical and not a legal matter, both settler and Indian are
entitled to the benefit of the Biblical adjuration: 'Judge not, that
8 Id. at 435 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
'Id.0Id To bolster his point, Rehnquist ripped out of context a quotation by the historian
Ray Billington in a National Park Service guidebook, as is clear even from the paragraph
Rehnquist quoted. On this subject, I benefitted greatly from a student paper by Joseph
Alexander, Jr., class of 1993, Boston University School of Law. Rehnquist went on to quote
an appalling generalization in SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 540 (1965), in which Morison said of the Plains Indians, "They lived only
for the day, recognized no rights of property, robbed or killed anyone if they thought they
could get away with it, inflicted cruelty without a qualm, and endured torture without
flinching." Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 437. Rehnquist appeared to endorse the accuracy of
Admiral Morison's account. To be charitable, however, perhaps Rehnquist simply sought to
demonstrate that historians disagree.
" Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 435 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist could not resist
a snide distinction between historians who take different positions-those who are "not
writing for the purpose of having their conclusions or observations inserted in the reports
of congressional committees,--and unspecified other historians who are exactly that venal
in Rehnquist's view. Id.
62Id.
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ye be not judged.' 63 To draw such a stark dichotomy between
historical and legal matters in the context of the Sioux case was
noteworthy in itself. The paradox of Rehnquist's effort to undercut
judging within the process of adjudication is startling. In a sense,
it encapsulates why lack of remembrance is so devastating in the
judicial context. Weirdly, Rehnquist here seems to jettison the very
idea of legal precedent. The wound done to justice is clarified
starkly by Rehnquist's attempt to segregate entirely judicial and
historical functions.
When the Supreme Court revisited the Fort Laramie Treaty and
its long and convoluted legal aftermath a few years later in a
different and less dramatic context, historical accuracy simply
washed away entirely. If judges ignore history at their peril, they
hardly compensate by making up history as they go. Even a great
desire to embrace winners' history ought not to permit what
purports to be implicit history to trump the explicit historical
record. In South Dakota v. Bourland," Justice Thomas's majority
opinion held that a series of Federal Flood Control Acts in the
1940s and 1950s deprived the Sioux not merely of still more of
their trust lands, but also of the power to regulate hunting and
fishing by non-Indians within the reservation.' The Tribe had
decided it would no longer allow non-Indians to hunt deer on the
sole basis of their South Dakota hunting licenses. Instead, the
Tribe now sought to regulate the hunting itself, and to do its own
licensing of non-Indians on reservation lands taken for flood control
purposes by the federal government.'
To the Bourland majority, the purpose of the relevant federal
legislation-which nowhere even mentioned abrogation of Indian
sovereignty over hunting and fishing-was not decisive. It was not
even relevant. Instead, Thomas emphasized that "the effect of the
transfer is the destruction of pre-existing Indian rights to regulato-
ry control. " 7 This, of course, is circular reasoning. The effect was
not that effect until the Court so legitimized it in this opinion. The
Court's logical legerdemain here-its emphasis on effect and its
Id. at 437.
113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993).
Id. at 2315-16.
SId. at 2314.
67 Id. at 2318.
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view that congressional purpose simply was irrelevant-is even
more striking because it contrasts so starkly with the Court's
repeated insistence over the past several decades that a demonstra-
tion of discriminatory purpose is a necessary prerequisite to proof
of an equal protection violation.' Effect will not suffice to prove
constitutional discrimination, but it is adequate to remove the
jurisdiction of what Noatak had recently emphasized was another
sovereign. The blatant overriding of tribal sovereignty in Bourland
was based entirely on unwritten, implicit practices.
This is particularly ironic against the backdrop of the Court's
concession that "pursuant to its original treaty with the United
States, the Cheyenne River Tribe possessed both the greater power
to exclude non-Indians from, and arguably the lesser-included,
incidental power to regulate non-Indian use of, the lands later
taken for the Oahe Dam and Reservoir Project."69 That the
greater power includes the lesser power is a favorite trope of the
conservative wing of the Court. Therefore, such a statement was
ominous even when it initially appeared to favor tribal control. The
concept quickly was inverted and used against the Sioux. Premis-
ing his claim on two shaky recent precedents, Thomas wrote that
"when an Indian tribe conveys ownership of its tribal lands to non-
Indians, it loses any former right of exclusive use and occupation
of the conveyed lands."v° Thomas then administered the coup de
m See, e.g., City of Richmond v. JAL Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding minority
set-aside invalid because no identified earlier racially discriminatory purpose had been
specified); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding invidious discrimination must
be traceable to a racially discriminatory purpose). There has been considerable discussion
of this doctrinal development over the past two decades. For a summary of that literature
and my own critique, see Soifer, supra note 1.
South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1993).
7Id. Thomas relied on Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) and Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). For a
devastating critique of the sharply-divided decision in BrendaIe, and of its relationship to
Montana, see Joseph W. Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1991).
Thomas's reliance on Montana is particularly illogical and directly undercuts the legal
claim he makes about what was implicit in the 1940s. Montana marked a great departure
from earlier precedent. Thomas himself acknowledged this elsewhere within Bourland. He
even criticized the dissenters for their failure to recognize the new reality in federal Indian
law created by Montana when he complained that the dissent "shuts both eyes to the reality
that after Montana, tribal sovereignty over nonmembers 'cannot survive without express
congressional delegation,' and is therefore not inherent." Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2320 n.15
(citation omitted) (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564). Bourland's use of Montana as a
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grace. He proclaimed, "The abrogation of this greater right ...
implies the loss of regulatory jurisdiction over the use of the land
by others.""1
By this logic, there is virtually nothing left of tribal sovereignty.
Congress has plenary power. This greater power necessarily
includes implicit power to abrogate all lesser tribal powers
whenever Congress wishes. And, according to this bizarre logic, the
tribe should have understood, many years prior to this judicial
proclamation of a radically new doctrine, that they were giving
away all lesser tribal power when they yielded to governmental
demands for land under the Flood Control Act of 1944.
If this logic were not faulty enough, the majority soon made its
position even less defensible. Congress had reserved limited land-
use rights for the tribe. Somehow this protection of tribal rights
supported the repeal of all other rights by implication. Thomas put
it bluntly: "When Congress reserves limited rights to a tribe or its
members, the very presence of such a limited reservation of rights
suggests that the Indians would otherwise be treated like the
public at large." 2 This is a striking example of the Power of the
Initial (Legal) Presumption. Here the presumption works with
devastating effectiveness against any and all tribal claims because
it simply assumes that Indians are in no way special historically.
Although a tribe may be akin to a foreign nation under Noatak,"
it and its members are "like the public at large" unless Congress
substitute for history is a bizarre version of nunc pro tunc.
The Court's willingness in Bourland to play fast and loose with tribal sovereignty over
property stands in bitter contrast to the constitutional reverence for individual control over
property articulated in Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987). In Hodel, the Court
deemed one's right to pass on property to heirs to be similar to the right to exclude others,
which the Court proclaimed " 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that
are commonly characterized as property.'" Id. (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). Hodel invalidated a 1983 federal statute that allowed tiny fractions
of property tracts to escheat to tribes, although the Court conceded that "fractionation" of
individual Native American land holdings has become "a serious public problem," id. at 718;
that encouraging consolidation "is a public purpose of high order," id. at 712; and that
"consolidation of Indian lands in the Tribe benefits the members of the Tribe," id. at 715.
71 Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2316. The Court did not reach the question of whether a
different result might follow were the government's greater power said to imply the loss of
lesser Indian power over 'a 'closed' or pristine area" or in other contexts. Id. at 2316 n.9.
2 Id. at 2319.
"
3See supra notes 14-38 and accompanying text.
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explicitly states otherwise as a matter of largess.74
Thomas gave lip-service to the standard principle that" 'statutes
are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambigu-
ous provisions interpreted to their benefit.' "71 Over 150 years
ago, the Court said that Indian occupancy rights were "as sacred as
the fee simple of whites," 76 and that Indian tribes retain a "right
to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by
a voluntary cession to our government."77 The flamboyant pre-
sumptions and spurious logic of contemporary decisions such as
Noatak and Bourland turn older ideas and precedents upside down.
To be sure, the ongoing conquest of Indian lands-and the often
brutal collaborative actions by Congress, the Executive, and the
courts-hardly heeded the words of early judicial decisions that
sought to protect Indian legal claims. Surely this harsh historical
reality does not excuse judges today who play fast and loose with
precedents and with purportedly logical constraints. If anything,
past judicial complicity in outrages perpetrated against Native
Americans ought to make today's judges particularly sensitive to
historical claims. Yet Abstract History, Cumulative History, and
Implicit History all seem to flow together in the three decisions we
considered. At their confluence, history is, in fact, not relevant.
CONCLUSION
The careless, perhaps even cynical manipulation of foundational
words and past deeds in these three contemporary opinions
contrasts starkly with the power of words and the great weight of
the past articulated in Native American cultures. That tradition
71 Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2319.
75 Id. at 2316. This is boiler-plate language that stretches back for more than a century.
Thomas quoted Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683, 693 (1992), which quoted
older decisions for the idea. Other citations he omitted would have emphasized both the
longevity and the respectability of the idea that, in construing statutes and treaties, "[t]he
language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their prejudice," as
Chief Justice John Marshall put it in the famous decision, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515, 582 (1832).
78 Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835).
7 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
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emphasizes "the rich complexity of meanings""8 in traditional
American Indian narratives. Karl Kroeber and other authors in his
compilation convincingly make the case that "lilt is our scholarship,
not Indian literature, which is 'primitive' or undeveloped."79
To understand the tremendous and tragic gap exemplified in
these judicial opinions, it is hardly necessary to develop expertise
in American Indian literary art, for example, or in anthropology.
Moreover, one surely must be wary of the familiar tendency to
romanticize some mythic Noble Savage. Yet this brief legal review
of undramatic recent decisions concerning Native Americans
emphasizes how lacking in nuance-indeed how primi-
tive-contemporary judicial approaches to history, meaning, and
accuracy actually are.
All these judges claim to rely on history, but they all betray a
failure to remember. Whether tragedy or farce, the different
judicial invocations of history demonstrate law-office history at its
worst. The judges not only fail to comprehend the meaning of
history. They are also strikingly inept in their consideration of the
history of meaning. The lack of understanding that is so clear and
the correlative denigration of the need for mutual translation in
these decisions demonstrate that our mainstream legal culture has
gleaned little from the nation's long history of partial justice toward
Native Americans. If we have learned anything from our past
mistakes, it may be an urge to repeat them exactly.
To rely on history in the cause of violence entails willingness to
pursue a gruesome curse. As Nobel Prize-winning poet Joseph
Brodsky said about bloodshed in the Balkans, "Whenever one pulls
the trigger in order to rectify history's mistakes, one lies. For
history makes no mistakes, since it has no purpose."8° But it is
radically different when we consider history in the context of the
legitimized force-and the legitimating functions-of those
78 Karl Kroeber, An Introduction to the Art of Traditional American Indian Narration, in
TRADITIONAL LrrERATURES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN: TEXTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 1,8 (Karl
Kroeber ed., 1981). Kroeber and the other authors in this compilation explore the
interworking of texture, text, and context within American Indian oral traditions, and they
probe the complexity of any translation.
7'Id. at 9.
'8 Joseph Brodsky, Blood, Lies And the Trigger Of History, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1993, at
A19.
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remedies that judges have the power either to impose or to reject.
Judges ought to be held to a higher standard than soldiers in the
intertwined matters of history and justice.
Indeed, history should be a constant concern for those who judge.
To abuse or ignore history is to forget a crucial link. Finding out
what happened and why should be crucially relevant when judges
consider Native American legal claims. Legal amnesia is always
unjust. But injustice is compounded-and becomes almost
unbearably poignant and powerful-when failures of memory,
meaning, and history are invoked to brush away the claims of
Native Americans."' Native Americans as a group have been
victimized by past legal machinations more than most people in the
United States. No ahistorical antiseptic can camouflage the wound.
No judicial cleansing will eliminate the stain.
s' Judicial writing that assaults the past in the name of history, such as the opinions
discussed in this Essay, might be the greatest contemporary indignity for Native Americans.
As Sam Stanley put it, "Indians have a perspective toward modern life which involves their
own past deeply. The treaties, which most non-Indians regard trivially, are a sacred part
of their life. ... They had their roots here thousands of years before Europeans arrived.
They are acutely aware of the specific ways in which they lost possession of over 98 percent
of the land to non-Indians. All of this involves history, and it is living history to Indi-
ans-handed down orally in every tribe, a part of their collective bitter experience." SAM
STANLEY, AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 6 (1978), quoted in a fine paper by
Melissa Williams, Memory, History and Membership: The Moral Claims of Marginalized
Groups in American Political Representation 15 (presented at the Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association) (Sept. 1992) (on file with the Georgia Law Review).
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